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Positioning Store Brands against National Brands: 
Get Close or Keep a Distance? 
ABSTRACT 
A stream of academic research has suggested that retailers may be better off positioning 
their store brands close to the national brands by promoting their store brands as being similar to 
the national brands. Retailers also appear to have embraced this notion. In this manuscript, we 
investigate this strongly held belief and ask the question - should store brands always strive to be 
"like national brands?" Analysis of a game theoretic model identifies eight market conditions 
when positioning a store brand close to a national brand may be less profitable or unprofitable. 
In particular, we find that close store brand positioning may not be profitable in categories where 
the manufacturer can expand category demand through non-price marketing investments such as 
advertising, or when there is a significant "unserved" (by national brand) market that can be 
served by the store brand. 
A follow-up empirical analysis, using data on 109 grocery products from two retail 
chains, reveals that positioning a store brand close to the national brand is less likely in 
categories whose sales are expandable and in highly advertised categories, but more likely in 
high-margin categories and where the national brand has a large market share. Together, the 
analytical model and the empirical findings enhance our understanding of a retailer's store brand 
positioning strategy. Future research can investigate the effect of store competition, price 
promotions, and other factors on store brand positioning. 
Key Words: Private Labels, Positioning, Marketing Strategy, Channels of Distribution, Game 
Theory 
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Get Close or Keep a Distance? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Private labels or store brands have become a force to reckon with in the United States. 
Dollar sales of private labels in grocery products have grown 38% during 1997-2002, nearly 
twice the growth (19%) of national brands during the same time period (AC Nielsen 2003). As a 
result, the dollar share of private labels has grown from about 14% in 1996 to about 16% in 
2001. The unit volume market share in the United States is about 20% (source: Private Label 
Manufactures Association website: www.plma.org). 
Buoyed by this growth trend, or otherwise, there is a general tendency among retailers to 
increase the sales of private labels at the expense of national brands in several ways including 
"positioning" the store brand close to the national brand (A&P Annual Report 2001; 
www.plma.org, Lauhnor and Terhune 2003). In the context of national brand vs. store brand 
competition, store brand positioning is broadly conceptualized as the extent of similarity between 
that private label and the national brand. Retailers attempt to position their store brand close to 
the national brand in at least four ways: (i) increasing the quality of store brand and reducing the 
perceived quality gap between national brand and store brand, (ii) imitating national brand 
packaging (often called the copycat strategy), (iii) placing the store brand on the shelf right next 
to the national brand, and (iv) using shelf talkers with "compare and save" or similar slogans. 
Academic research also tends to support the retailers' desire to position their store brands 
close to the national brand. Several researchers (e.g., Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2002, Morton and 
Zettelmeyer 2000, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995, Mills 1995, Sethuraman 1989) have 
directly or indirectly addressed the question of whether or not store brands should be positioned 
close to national brands. Details of this literature are provided in §2. These articles appear to 
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unanimously suggest that retailers would be better off (obtain higher category profits) by 
positioning their store brands close to the national brands, especially the leading national brand. 
The purpose of this manuscript is to further investigate this strongly-held belief and 
explore the following questions: 
(i) Is it always in the interest of the retailer to position the store brands close to the 
national brands? 
(ii) If not, what are the conditions when it would be profitable not to position the store 
brand close to national brands, and why? 
(iii) In the real world, we do find some product categories in which the store brands mimic 
the national brands and some categories in which they do not. Can we prescribe to 
the managers in what categories they should adopt the former and in what categories 
they should follow the latter strategy? 
(iv) Alternately, can we explain retailers' store brand positioning behavior through 
theoretical analysis? 
This manuscript addresses the above questions through an equilibrium analysis of the 
actions of a manufacturer selling a national brand and a retailer who sells both the national brand 
and the store brand. Our analytical model incorporates several factors not included in previous 
literature, viz., category expansion, unserved (by national brand) market, cost differences, and 
heterogeneity in reservation prices. The analysis identifies some market conditions when the 
conventional belief that retailers should position their store brand close to the national brand may 
not hold. In particular, we find that a retailer may not find it profitable to position its store brand 
close to the national brand in categories where the manufacturer can expand category demand 
through non-price marketing investments such as product improvements and advertising. Close 
store brand positioning may also not be profitable when there is a significant "unserved" (by 
national brand) market that can be served by the store brand. 
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We then empirically analyze data on store brand positioning collected from two 
supermarket chain stores across 109 grocery products and test some implications from our 
analytical model. In particular, we find that positioning a store brand close to the national brand 
is less likely in categories whose sales are expandable and in highly advertised categories, but 
more likely in high-margin categories and where the national brand has a large market share. 
We believe the manuscript makes theoretical, empirical, and methodological 
contributions in the following ways. On the theoretical front, it prescribes eight market 
conditions when positioning a store brand close to the national brand may be less profitable (or 
unprofitable). On the empirical side, it identifies four category characteristics that influence 
store brand positioning in the real world. We believe the manuscript also makes a modest 
methodological contribution by developing an analytical model that incorporates variables such 
as category expansion, unserved market, and consumer heterogeneity, which have not been 
studied in previous marketing channels literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review pertinent literature on store brand 
positioning and motivate the present research. §3 describes the analytical model. §4 presents the 
results from the basic equilibrium analysis. In §5, we test the robustness of the basic results as 
well as obtain additional insights. §6 presents the empirical analysis and results. In §7, we 
conclude by discussing the key results, limitations, and future research directions. 
2. LITRATURE REVIEW 
In an insightful modeling work on store brand positioning, Sayman, Hoch and Raju 
(2002) have provided several analytical results with useful implications for retailers and store 
brand managers. First, the authors show that it is profitable for retailers to position their store 
brands so as to increase the price competition with national brands. Second, if there are several 
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national brands, it is more profitable for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading 
national brand. Positioning is conceptualized in terms ofthe cross-price effect (price 
substitutability) between national brand and store brand, that is, positioning a store brand closer 
to the national brand implies that the cross-price effect between the two brands is increased. 
Other researchers have also suggested that retailers gain by increasing the cross-price 
sensitivity between national brand and store brand. Sethuraman (1989, p. 91) showed that the 
category profits and the proportion of total channel profits garnered by the retailer increase as the 
cross-price sensitivity between national brand and store brand increases, i.e., as the store brand is 
positioned closer to the national brand. Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995, Proposition 2) and 
Mills (1995, p. 520) also show that the retailer's profits are increasing with cross-price 
sensitivity. Taking a slightly different approach, Morton and Zettelmeyer (2000) employ a 
bargaining framework and argue that by positioning the store brand to mimic the national brand 
wielding monopoly power, the retailer can strengthen its bargaining position when negotiating 
supply terms with the national brand manufacturer. Thus, there is consistent theoretical support 
for the contention that retailers may be better off positioning the store brand close to the national 
brands, especially the leading national brand. Along similar lines, empirical researchers have 
also emphasized the importance of reducing the quality gap between national brand and store 
brand for achieving store brand success (Hoch and Banerji 1993, Richardson, Jain and Dick 
1996, Sethuraman and Cole 1999). 
These analytical and empirical results have led retailers and store brand managers to 
believe that an effective way to earn more profits is to increase the price substitutability between 
national brand and store brand. Retailers attempt to accomplish this objective by narrowing the 
quality gap and/or otherwise impressing upon the consumers that there is little difference 
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between national brand and store brand- so, why pay more? For instance, the Private Label 
Manufacturers Association (PLMA) website proclaims that, in a 1999 Gallup study, 75% of 
consumers ascribed similar levels of product quality to national brands and store brands. The 
Wall Street Journal (July 15, 1993) reports that, frequently, private labels are designed and 
packaged to signal close substitutability with national brands. 
The objective of this paper is to explore the basic question- should retailers always strive 
to be "like national brands" as analytical modelers and empirical researchers appear to suggest? 
Almost all the analytical models that recommend close store brand positioning: 
(i) assumed demand is linear in price, 
(ii) were based on aggregate demand function that did not evolve from individual 
consumer behavior, 
(iii) did not explicitly incorporate consumer heterogeneity, 
(iv) assumed marginal cost of national brand and store brand to be equal and set it to 0 
without loss of generality, 
(v) did not explicitly consider category expansion, 
(vi) did not incorporate non-price variables such as advertising, and 
(vii) did not consider store competition. 
The question then arises as to whether the conventional result that a store brand should be 
positioned close to the national brand will hold if these assumptions are relaxed. Our analytical 
model attempts to investigate this question by relaxing assumptions (i)- (vi), but we do not 
consider store competition. 
3. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
We focus on the competition between one national brand and one store brand. This focus 
is adequate in our case for highlighting the conditions when positioning a store brand close to the 
national brand may increase or decrease retailer profits. As Shugan (2002) states, simpler 
models (e.g., monopoly models) are useful for gaining insights, even if they don't exactly mirror 
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the real world. Furthermore, in about 40% of the product categories in the two supermarket 
chain stores we collected data from (discussed later in §6.2), the store brand competes with just 
one national brand. In categories where there are multiple brands, the national brand can be 
deemed as the leading brand, the one often targeted by the store brand (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 
2002). We first present the consumer behavior assumptions used to develop the demand 
function studied in our analytical model and then describe the game structure. 
3.1. Consumer Behavior 
Consumers' behavior with respect to purchase of national brand and store brand 
postulated in this paper is presented in Figure 1. There are K consumers in the market. Each 
consumer (i) has a reservation price ( r i) for the national brand. If price of national brand ( Pn) 
is less than the reservation price ( r i ), s/he considers the national brand. Then s/he inspects the 
price of the store brand ( p s ). If the actual price differential ( Pn - Ps ) is less than the reservation 
price differential ( d i ), i.e., the price premium that consumers are willing to pay for the national 
brand over the store brand, then the consumer purchases the national brand; if not, the consumer 
purchases the store brand. 
Those whose reservation price for the national brand is less than the national brand price, 
i.e., those who are unwilling to pay the (high) price for the national brand, inspect the price of the 
store brand (Ps) and compare it with their reservation price for the store brand, given that it is 
the only brand in their consideration set. If the store brand price is less than its reservation price, 
the consumer purchases the store brand; if not, s/he does not purchase any brand. We assume 
that a consumer's reservation price for the store brand is less than or equal to his/her reservation 
price for the national brand, consistent with previous models on store brands (e.g., Lal 1990, Rao 
1991) and general empirical observations (e.g., Abe 1998, Sethuraman and Cole 1999). 
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Consumer Behavior Model 
Consumer i 
Inspect price Pn 
N y 
Purchase SB 
Pn price of national brand (NB) 
Ps price of store brand (SB) 
ri Consumer i's reservation price for national brand 
N 
Exclude NB from 
consideration 
Inspect price Ps 
Do not purchase any brand 
rsi Consumer i's reservation price for store brand when it is the only available option 
di reservation price differential between national brand and store brand 
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3.2. Demand Function 
Let f(r) represent the (continuous) distribution function of the reservation price ( r i) 
across the K consumers and f( d) represent the corresponding distribution of reservation price 
differential ( d i ). When national brand price ( Pn ), is greater than the reservation price ( r i ), 
the consumer is left with the option of either purchasing the store brand or not purchasing any 
brand. Faced with this situation, consumers may set their reservation price for the store brand in 
different ways. On the one hand, some consumers who desire to purchase a brand, rather than 
not purchasing any brand, may simply decide to purchase the store brand if the price of the store 
brand is less than their original reservation price for the national brand ( r i ). In this case, 
rsi = r i . On the other hand, some consumers may still not be willing to pay the national brand 
reservation price for the store brand even if the store brand is the only one affordable. In this 
case, rsi < r i . 
To account for these possibilities, we adopt the following approach. Suppose all 
consumers have reservation price for store brand when they can not afford the national brand to 
be the same as reservation price for national brand, i.e., rsi = r i . In this case, r i can be deemed 
as the reservation price for the category. Then, for any set of prices Pn, Ps , all consumers whose 
reservation prices are below that of the national brand but above that of the store brand will 
purchase the store brand. In other words, 
Maximum (potential) market unserved by the national brand at price Pn that can be 
served by the store brand at price Ps 
= all consumers whose reservation prices are between Pn and Ps, i.e., Ps < q < Pn. 
Let v (O::Sv :::; 1) be the fraction of the above potential market that is actually served by the store 
brand. Then, 
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Market actually served by the store brand at price p s 
= v * (number of consumers whose reservation price is between Pn and Ps ). 
Based on the above notations, we can write the demand function for national brand as: 
(1) qn =K{J f(r) Jf(d)}. 
Pn Pn-Ps 
The demand function for the store brand can be represented as follows: 
The first term in the RHS of Equation (2) represents store brand sales through competitive 
encroachment of national brand market; the second term represents the market that is unserved 
by the national brand at price Pn, that is tapped by the store brand at price Ps. 
3.3. Distribution Assumptions 
We assume that the reservation price (r) is normally distributed with mean J..lr and 
standard deviation O'r, i.e., r ~ N(J..lr, O'r). Hierarchical Bayes models (e.g., Allenby and Rossi 
1999, Kim, Blattberg, and Rossi 1995) have been shown to capture market level heterogeneity 
quite well. These models typically assume that brand preferences (a measure of reservation 
price) and price sensitivities are normally distributed (Sethuraman and Srinivasan 2002). 
In a similar vein, the reservation price differential (d) is assumed to be distributed 
normally with mean J..ld and standard deviation crd, i.e., d ~ N(J..ld, cr d). Using scanner data, 
Abe (1998) estimated the reservation price difference (RPD) between national brands and store 
brands in several product categories and found that normal distribution was a reasonable 
approximation for the distribution of RPD across consumers. In a study using survey data, 
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Sethuraman and Cole (1999) obtained self-reported reservation price differential measures 
(premium willing to pay for national brands over store brands) from 132 consumers across 20 
product categories. In many categories, the distribution of RPD was unimodal. Though the 
distribution was not exactly symmetric and there were product differences, on aggregate, normal 
distribution appears to be a reasonable representation of the heterogeneity across consumers. 
Finally, we assume that r i andd i are uncorrelated. There is some empirical evidence 
that the relationship between the two may be weak. For example, Fitzell (1992), Sethuraman and 
Cole (1999) note that the relationship between income (a potential surrogate for reservation price 
r i -- higher the income, higher is the r i) and store brand proneness (a possible surrogate for 
reservation price differential because store brand prone consumers tend to have lower d i ) is 
either non-significant or at best marginally significant. Later, in §5, we relax this assumption. 
Based on the above distributional assumptions, we rewrite the demand functions as 
(3) qn ~K[J-w(Pncr~~r )][1-w(Pn -:: -~d )}and 
(4) q, ~K[I-w(Pncr~~r )][ w(Pn -:: -~d )]+Kv[ w(Pncr~~r )-w(Pscr~~r )] 
<I> is the cumulative density of a standard normal distribution, N(O,l). Figure 2 provides a 
pictorial representation of the sources of national brand and store brand demand. 
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Figure 2 
Representation of Demand 















SB I Market 1 
NS I I purchasers 1 
Ps Pn Pn- Ps 
NS Competitive market served by both national brand (NB) and store brand (SB) 
NS Market unserved by national brand at price Pn that can be served by store brand at price Ps· 
N S Market unserved by both national brand and store brand 
The bell curve on the left hand side represents the distribution of reservation price, f(r). 
For any given prices Pn and Ps, three markets are delineated: (i) competitive market (NS), 
consisting of consumers who consider both national brand and store brand because their 
reservation price is greater than Pn, (ii) market ( NS) unserved by national brand but potentially 
served by store brand, consisting of consumers whose reservation price is below Pn but above 
Ps, and (iii) market (N S) that is unserved by both national and store brands, consisting of 
consumers whose reservation price is below Ps. 
The competitive market (NS) is shared between the national brand and the store brand 
based on the distribution of reservation price differential, f( d) as shown on the RHS of Figure 2. 
Consumers whose RPD is greater (less) than Pn -ps purchase the national (store) brand. 
Note that as Jlr increases, the bell curve f(r) in Figure 2 shifts to the right. Other things 
equal, for any given prices Pn, Ps , more consumers are served, and thus category demand (NS + 
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NS) increases. Hence, we call J.lr as the category expansion parameter. We assume that the 
national brand manufacturer can increase J.lr through investments in non-price marketing 
investments such as advertising, product improvement, publicity, or other promotions. 
As f.ld decreases, the bell curve f(d) in Figure 2 shifts to the left. Other things equal, at 
any given prices p n and Ps , sales of store brand increases and sales of national brand decreases, 
i.e., more consumers switch from national brand to store brand. In this regard, J.ld is analogous 
to the national brand- store brand cross-price sensitivity parameter (8) used in traditional linear 
models (Mills 1995, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995, Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2002 -low 
J.ld =>high 8 =>close store brand positioning). J.ld is thus an indicator of the positioning of 
store brand against the national brand and we call it the store brand positioning parameter. 
Retailer can influence J.ld with marketing activities that include enhancing perceived quality of 
store brand, positioning the store brand on the shelf next to the national brand, and/or imitating 
national brand packaging. Parameters cr r and cr d are measures of heterogeneity in reservation 
price and reservation price differential, respectively. 
3.4. Game Structure 
In this market, decisions are assumed to take place in the following order: 
Retailer sets store brand positioning, J.ld 
~ 
Manufacturer sets f.lr 
~ 
Manufacturer sets wholesale price, w n 
Retailer sets retail~prices, Pn and Ps 
Ultimately, we seek to understand how equilibrium store brand positioning might be influenced 
by market conditions. To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we first consider the retail 
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pricing game (Stage 1), then the manufacturer wholesale price game (Stage 2), then 
manufacturer's category expansion decision (Stage 3) and finally, the retailer positioning game 
(Stage 4). These stages are described below: 
Stage 1. In the first stage, retailer sets retail prices p n , p s to maximize its profits 
(5) Max (pn -wn)qn +(ps -c8 )q8 , 
Pn•Ps 
where Wn is the wholesale price of the national brand and c8 is the marginal cost ofthe store 
brand (assumed constant). Fixed costs are assumed to be zero. 
Stage 2. The national brand manufacturer sets wholesale price w n to maximize its 
profits knowing the retailer's price setting behavior, i.e., manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. 
(6) Max (wn -en) qn, 
Wn 
where Cn is the constant marginal cost of the national brand. 
Denote the manufacturer's and retailer's equilibrium profits from the above pricing game 
(Stages 1 and 2) as IImp(llr• ).ld, n) and Ilrp{!lro ).ld, n), respectively, where n represents the 
set of all other parameters, 0 E {K, c8 , Cn, a r, ad, V} 
Stage 3. Manufacturer maximizes its profits over llr 
(7) Maxllmp(!lr,).ld,n)-C(!lr), 
llr 
where c(llr) is the cost of increasing llr . 
Stage 4. Retailer maximizes its profits over lld, given the actions in all previous stages. 




where llr3 is the retailer's profits from Stage 3 and C~d) is the cost of positioning the store 
brand close to the national brand. 
4. BASIC EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
Note that the demand functions represented by Equations (3) and (4) are non-linear. 
Therefore, closed form solutions are not possible even for the pricing game. We adopt a 
numerical approach to perform the equilibrium analysis. Where the models have been relatively 
complex and/or analytically intractable, a numerical approach has been used in a wide variety of 
situations (e.g., Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995, Neslin, Powell, and Stone 1995, Tellis and 
Zufryden 1995). 
In the basic equilibrium analysis presented in this section, the numerical approach 
consists of (i) developing a reasonable initial set of parameters, (ii) analyzing the profit 
maximizing problems in Stages (1)-(4), and (iii) obtaining qualitative insights. In §5, we vary 
the parameter values, test the robustness of the results from §4, and obtain additional insights. 
4.1. Initial Set of Parameter Values 
The initial set of parameter values are given in Table 1. Note that all parameters (except 
v and K) can be expressed in monetary units. 
Table 1 
Parameter Values used in Numerical Analysis 
Description Notation 
Initial value (range) used Range investigated in 
in basic equilibrium extended equilibrium 
analysis (§4) analysis (§5) 
Cost of national brand Cn 1 (wlog) 1 (wlog) 
Cost of store brand Cs 1 0.5- 1.5 
Mean reservation price ).lr 3 3- 10 
(3 ~ 4) in stage 3 
Mean reservation price ).ld 1 1 - 5 
differential (1 ~ 0.2) in stage 3, 4 
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Std. dev. of reservation price Cir 1.5 1 -2 
Std. dev. of reservation price Cict 0.5 0.25- 0.75 
differential 
Proportion of unserved v 1 0.6- 1 
market served by store brand (0.6- 1) 
Market size - # of consumers K 100 (wlog) 100-1000 
wlog without loss of generality 
First, we start by normalizing the marginal cost of national brand and set Cn to be 1, 
without loss of generality. For instance, if unit cost of national brand is (say) $5, we can treat $5 
as one unit of price. All other costs and prices will be divided by 5. Empirical evidence on the 
cost of store brand relative to the cost of national brand is not conclusive. Managers generally 
believe that store brand procurement costs are lower due to low promotional costs; on the other 
hand, national brand costs may be lower due to economies of scale derived from large-scale 
production and national distribution. Almost all prior literature on national brand - store brand 
competition (e.g., Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2002, Mills 1995) have assumed that the cost of 
producing national brand and store brand are equal. Consistent with this literature, we assume 
the cost of store brand Cs to be 1. 
In general, there is a wide variation in manufacturer's margin ( w n - Cn ), which can 
Cn 
range from 20% to 200%. Assuming a high 100% margin on cost, the wholesale price would be 
$2. Retailer gross margin ( Pn - w n ) in grocery products is generally about 30% of retail price 
Pn 
(Sethuraman and Tellis 2002). So, the retail price ofmitional brand with these margins works 
out to approximately $2.86. We center the mean reservation price (!lr) around this value and 
assume llr = 3. Sethuraman and Cole (1999) notes that, on average consumers are willing to 
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pay a premium of 30% for national brand over store brand. Accordingly, we assume J.!d = 
0.3 * J.!r (= 3), or rounding up, J.!d = 1. Sethuraman and Cole (1999) also find that the standard 
deviation of the distribution of reservation price differential is 30% to 70% ofthe mean 
reservation price differential across the 20 product categories they investigated. We assume that 
the standard deviation is about 50% of the mean and set crd = 0.5 * J.!d = 0.5. Similarly, we set 
<rr = 0.5 * J.!r = 1.5. The assumptions on crr and crd ensure that only a small portion of 
consumers (2.3%) have negative reservation price and negative reservation price differential, 
consistent with general market observations in grocery products. Finally, the proportion (v) of 
unserved by national brand market captured by the store brand is assumed to be 1 to begin with -
that is all consumers who can not afford the national brand purchase the store brand if Ps < 1J , 
and then varied from 0.6 to 1. 
4.2. Numerical Analysis Procedure 
The numerical analysis procedure for solving the profit maximization problems 
represented in §3.4 consists of the following four steps. 
Step 1. Investigating Characteristics of Demand Functions 
We varied national brand price from 1 ( = Cn) to 6 ( = J.! r + 2cr r ) in increments of 0. 01. 
We varied store brand price from 1 to Pn in increments ofO.Ol. All other parameters were set at 
the initial values shown in Table 1 (Column 3). The demand functions for national brand and 
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The demand function for national brand (i) is smooth and downward sloping in own 
price, (ii) is higher when the competitive store brand price is higher, and (iii) appears to be s-
shaped, with demand tending to zero when price of national brand is 2 (=4 O"d) units more than 
the store brand price. The third characteristic results from the assumption of normality of the 
distributions, especially f(d). When the price difference (Pn -ps) is very low or very high, the 
market is operating in the tails of the normal distribution; any decrease or increase in national 
brand price does not switch many consumers in that region, and the demand function is flat. 
The demand for store brand (Figure 3B) also (i) is smooth and downward sloping in own 
price, (ii) is higher when the competitive national brand price is higher, and (iii) appears to be s-
shaped, with demand tending to zero when price of national brand equals the store brand price. 
In addition, the effect of national brand price on store brand demand (cross-price sensitivity) 
diminishes significantly when the price of the store brand is low relative to the price ofthe 
national brand. Again, this occurrence is a result of the market operating in the right-tail of the 
normal f(d) distribution. For example, when Ps =1, almost all consumers have switched to the 
store brand when Pn =3 so that the store brand demand is unaffected whether Pn =3 or Pn =5. 
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Step 2. Analysis of Stages 1 and 2 - Retailer and manufacturer price setting games. 
Stage 1 analysis was performed in the following manner. We fixed the wholesale price to 
some value w. For this w, we computed retail profits using Equation (5) over the range of retail 
prices ( 1 s p n s 6 ) and ( 1 s p s s p n ) . All other parameters are fixed at the values given in 
Table 1 (Column 3). Retailer's profit function was concave and relatively smooth over prices 
Pn, Ps leading to a unique interior global maximum at prices P~l and P;l. We repeated the 
exercise for different values ofw (1 s w s 5 ) in increments of0.01 to get the manufacturer's 
reaction function. 
Stage 2 equilibrium analysis was performed in the following manner. For each value w, 
we substituted the retail prices P~l, P;l into the national brand demand function (3) to get qn. 
We used this demand to compute manufacturer profits (Equation 6). The manufacturer's profit 
function over the range of wholesale prices was also found to be relatively smooth and concave. 
Thus we were able to identify a unique set of equilibrium prices within ±0.01 accuracy for the 
parameter values indicated in Table 1 (Column 3 ). They are w ~ = 1.57, p~ =3.84, p; = 2.85. 
From these values, we can compute quantities sold and profits at the end of Stage 2. 
Since category expansion coefficient J.!r and store brand positioning coefficient J.!d are 
the two key parameters of interest in this paper, which are to be investigated in Stages 3 and 4 of 
the game, it is useful to provide the effect of these parameters on equilibrium values from stages 
1 and 2. First, we computed equilibrium prices ( w~, p~, p;) by varying J.!r from 3 to 4 in 
increments of 0.1. All other parameters were held constant at the values given in Table 1 
(Column 3). The following are the findings. 
18 
For any given set of parameter values in Table 1 (Column 3), as J.lr increases, 
Fl. manufacturer wholesale price and margin increase, 
F2. retail price of national brand and retail margin on national brand increase, 
F3. retail price of store brand and retail margin on store brand increase, 
F4. quantity sold of national brand and store brand increase. 
F5. manufacturer profits increase, and 
F6. retailer profits on national brand, store brand, and total retailer profits increase. 
Findings Fl-F6 are quite intuitive. An increase in J.lr increases the total number of purchasers at 
any given prices Pn, Ps, thus shifting demand outward. This outward shift in demand increases 
prices and sales of both national brand and store brand in equilibrium. Thus, both manufacturers 
and retailers are better off when J.lr increases. 
The effect of store brand positioning J.ld on prices and profits was obtained by varying 
J.ld from 1 to 0.2- all other parameters set at their initial levels. As J.ld decreases (i.e., as store 
brand is positioned closer to national brand): 
F7. manufacturer wholesale price and margins decrease, 
F8. retail price of national brand and retail margin on national brand decrease, 
F9. retail price of store brand and retail margin on store brand increase, 
FlO. price differential between national brand and store brand decreases, 
F 11. sales of national brand decreases while sales of store brand increases, 
Fl2. manufacturer profits decrease, and 
Fl3. retailer profits on national brand decrease while profits on store brand increase. 
Findings F7-F13 are consistent with results from aggregate linear models (e.g., Raju, Sethuraman 
and Dhar 1995, Sethuraman 1989, Sayman, Hoch and Raju 2002, Mills 1995). This convergence 
in results provides both a robustness check on the results from previous literature using linear 
models, as well as a validation check on the present model and analytical procedure. The 
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findings are also intuitive. When a store brand is positioned close to the national brand, it takes 
away more consumers from the national brand for a given price differential. This increased 
competition for national brand customers forces the manufacturer to reduce its wholesale price in 
equilibrium and the national brand retail price and sales also decrease. As a result, close store 
brand positioning decreases national brand profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. 
The reverse takes place for the store brand. When Jld decreases, store brand gains more 
consumers for a given price differential. So, its prices and sales, and thus retailer profits on the 
store brand increase in equilibrium. 
What happens to total retailer profits when Jld decreases? Conventional belief, 
supported by previous analytical models, would suggest that total retailer profits would increase 
as Jld decreases (i.e., as store brand is positioned close to national brand). Our analysis reveals 
that the equilibrium retailer profits (excluding cost of positioning) increase or decrease with Jld 
depending on v, the proportion of potential store brand market unserved by the national brand 
that can be served by the store brand, as shown in Figure 4. (The x-axis is converted to 1- Jld to 
indicate closer store brand positioning, moving from left to right.). 
Figure4 
Effect of Store Brand Positioning on Retailer Profits (Stage 2) 
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Close store brand positioning (1-Jlct) 
Figure 4 leads to the following result: 
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F14. For a given set of parameter values as indicated in Table I (Column 3), when vis 
not large (about 0.6 in this analysis), retailer profits increase with close store 
brand positioning; however, when vis large (close to 1), retailer profits decrease 
with close store brand positioning. 
The first part of finding F14 is consistent with conventional beliefthat close store brand 
positioning benefits the retailer. The second part ofF14 goes contrary to conventional belief and 
identifies a condition when close store brand positioning may not be profitable after all. An 
intuition for this somewhat surprising result is given below: 
When 1-ld decreases, retailer profits on national brand decreases but profits on store brand 
increases. But, does the increase in store brand profits more than compensate for the decrease in 
national brand profits? When v is not large, it may and when v is large, it may not. Why? 
At any given prices Pn, Ps the total market can be divided into three regions based on the 
reservation prices - see also Figure 2 -- (i) the competitive market (NS) that can be served by 
both national and store brands ( IJ. > Pn ), (ii) market ( NS) that is not served by the national 
brand that can be potentially served by the store brand ( p s ~ q ~ p n ), and (iii) market ( N S ) not 
served by both national and store brands ( IJ. < Ps ). When a store brand is positioned closer ( 1-ld 
decreases), p~ decreases, p; increases. As a result, the competitive market (NS) increases, but 
the market unserved by national brand ( NS ), decreases as described in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Effect of Close Store Brand Positioning on Store Brand Sales 
Description Current closer positioning 
State (llct) ~ state (!! d -L\!! d) 
National Brand (NB) price * * Pn ~ Pn -L\pn 
Store Brand (SB) price * ~ * * Ps Ps +L\ps 
NS market size QNs ~ QNs +L\QNs 
Mkt share of SB from NS ~ ms(NS) + L\ ms 
market ffis(NS) 
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NS market size 
Mkt share of SB from NS 
market 
SB sales qs 
QNs ~ QNS -~QNS 
v ~ v 
After simplifying, incremental store brand sales due to close positioning is given by 
(9) qs (J.Ld - ~Jld)- qs (J.Ld) = ~ QNS (ms + ~ms) + QNs~m NS - V · ~QNS 
Net sales of store brand increases in general as Jld decreases, i.e., RHS ofEquation (9) is 
positive. However, if v is large, the incremental sales of store brand is less. In such a case, the 
incremental profits from store brand may not be adequate to meet the decrease in profits from the 
national brand, and net profits decreases with close store brand positioning. 
In qualitative terms, when a store brand is positioned close to the national brand, it forces 
the national brand manufacturer to be aggressive on price. This decreased national brand price 
results in the loss of retailer's "monopoly" market ( NS) which could not earlier afford the 
national brand. If the retailer gets a significant portion of this market (high v), then this loss 
would result in a net decrease in retailer profits. 
Step 3. Analysis of Stage 3 
Stage 3 analysis was conducted in the following manner. We allow Jlr to increase from 
3 (initial state) to 4 in increments of 0 .1. For each value of Jlr , we perform Stage 1 and Stage 2 
pricing game analyses as explained in Step 2 and compute equilibrium prices and profits. Figure 
5 (continuous lines) represents the movement of manufacturer gross profits from pricing game 
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From these graphs, we state the following finding: 
F15. As f..lr increases, manufacturer profits from pricing game increases; the increase 
in profits is lower when f..ld is lower and higher when f..ld is higher. 
When f..lr increases, category demand and, in particular, the competitive market (NS) expands. 
This market expansion benefits both the manufacturer and the retailer. However, the share of the 
benefit is determined by the positioning parameter, f..ld. If f..ld is high, manufacturer gets a 
significant share of the market expansion and its profits increase significantly with f..lr. 
However, if f..ld is low (store brand is positioned closer), then the retailer gets the bulk of the 
benefit from demand expansion and the manufacturer obtains little benefit from increasing f..lr . 
In stage 3, the manufacturer maximizes its profits (I1m3 =Ilmp -C(f..lr )) over f..lr. The 
optimal ,...,; depends on the cost of demand expansion, C{f..lr). If C( f..lr) is high, for example CH 
in Figure 5, then the manufacturer will not invest in f..lr and the optimal action will be 
continuation ofthe initial state at f..lr =3 for all values of f..ld (comer solution- see Figure 6A). 
If, on the other hand, the cost of demand expansion is not high (for example, CL) such that 
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* demand expansion is profitable and there is an interior solution, then the optimal 11r will always 
be higher when 11d is lower than when 11d is higher. For example, in the case of CL (designed 
* * * for illustrative purpose), 11r =3 when 11d =0.2; 11r =3.2 when 11d =0.6; and 11r =3.4 when 11d =1 
(see Figure 6B). 
Figure 6A 
Manufacturer Net Profits {CH) 
!ld = 1 
!ld=0.6 
lld = 0.2 
Category expansion parameter (J.ld) 
We state the following finding: 
Figure 68 
Manufacturer Net Profits {CL) 
Category expansion parameter (Jld) 
* F 16. The optimal 11r will be the same or higher as 11d increases. In particular, 
i. when the cost of demand expansion is high such that it is unprofitable to increase 
* 11r from its initial value for all values of 11d, then the optimal 11r will be the same 
(equal to its initial value) for all values of 11d. 
ii. when the cost of demand expansion is low to moderate such that demand expansion 
* is profitable, then the optimal 11r will be higher for higher values of 11d. 
Step 4. Analysis of Stage 4 
Stage 4 is retailer's store brand positioning game. The analysis is conducted as follows. 
Analysis of stage 3 yields equilibrium values (P~3, P;3, w ~3, 11;) for different values ofv (0.6 
to 1) and 11d (0.2 to 1). Based on these values, retailer's profits from Stage 3 (IIr3) is 
calculated using Equation (5). Retailer sets optimal 11~ to maximize IIr4 = IIr3- C(l1d). 
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Clearly, as Sayman, Hoch, and Raju (2002) also point out, if the cost of positioning C(J..Ld) is 
high, then the retailer would be less likely to position the store brand close to the national brand. 
In addition, we do not know the characteristics of the cost function. Therefore, we exclude cost 
from consideration and inspect the movement of Tir3 as a function of Jld. 
Figure 7A graphs the movement of retailer profits against Jld for the case corresponding 
to v=.6. When cost of category expansion is high (CH), retailer gross profits (excluding cost of 
positioning) increase with close positioning. However, when the cost of category expansion is 
low (CL), retailer profits decrease with close positioning. When v = 1 (Figure 7B), retailer 
profits decrease with close positioning for both cost functions CH and CL. 
Figure 7A 
Effect of Positioning on Retailer Profits 
(Stage 4, v=0.6) 
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Based on these observations, we state the following finding: 
F 17: When a store brand is positioned close to the national brand, retailer gross 
profits (excluding cost of positioning) increase when the cost of demand 
expansion C( llr) is high (CH) and proportion of unserved (by national brand) 
market served by store brand (v) is not high (v ~. 6). However, close store brand 
positioning decreases retailer profits when the cost of demand expansion is not 
high (CL) and/or when vis high (v ~ 1). 
25 
----------
4.3. Qualitative Insights from Basic Equilibrium Analysis 
Finding F17 yields two possible conditions when the conventional belief that close store 
brand positioning is always profitable for the retailer may not hold. Note that low cost of 
demand expansion implies that the category is expandable and high "v" implies that consumers 
with low reservation price who cannot afford the national brand are willing to purchase the stare 
brand. On this premise, we state the following qualitative insights. 
Qualitative Insight 1 
Positioning a store brand close to the national brand may not be profitable for the 
retailer if the national brand manufacturer can significantly expand category demand 
through investments in non-price marketing activities such as advertising. 
The intuition for this insight is as follows. When a store brand is positioned close to the national 
brand, the national brand's market share is threatened. The manufacturer of the national brand is 
forced to compete on the basis of price. The resulting lower manufacturer price, and thus 
manufacturer margins, discourages the manufacturer from investing in category demand 
enhancing activities. If the category is indeed expandable, this lack of resource commitment to 
category expansion makes both manufacturer and retailer worse off in terms of profits. 
Qualitative Insight 2 
Positioning a store brand close to the national brand may not be profitable for the 
retailer if the store brand can garner a significant portion of the market with low 
reservation price consumers, who can not afford to purchase the national brand. 
The intuition for this result is similar to that for insight 1. If a store brand is positioned close to 
the national brand, national brand price is decreased. As a result some consumers who could not 
afford the national brand earlier start to consider the national brand. Thus the store brand loses 
consumers from its "monopoly" market, where it was the only brand under consideration, to the 
competitive market where both national brand and store brand are under consideration. To the 
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extent that the store brand was attracting a significant portion of its "monopoly" market, this 
migration of consumers to the competitive market may hurt retailer profits. 
5. EXTENDED EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the extended analysis is to conduct equilibrium analysis by (i) changing 
the values of parameters that were held constant in §4 and (ii) relaxing certain assumptions in the 
basic model, with the twin objectives of testing the robustness of qualitative insights 1 and 2, as 
well as obtaining additional insights. 
5.1. Effect of Changes in Parameter Values 
The set of parameters (n)that were held constant in the basic analysis (Table 1, Column 
3) were: Q E { Cn, Cs ,f..lp ar, ad, K}. We continue to maintain Cn =1, without loss of generality. 
We changed all other parameters in the range indicated in Table 1 (Column 4) one at a time. 
We performed the equilibrium analysis the same way as in Steps 1-4 of §4.2. We computed 
incremental retailer profits from close store brand positioning (Figure 7A-B). We observed 
whether close store brand positioning is less profitable or unprofitable when the cost of category 
expansion C().! r) is lower (as in qualitative insight 1) and when the proportion of market 
unserved by national brand that is served by the store brand (v) is higher (as in qualitative insight 
2). In general, the above basic results were unchanged. We also investigated whether such 
incremental profits from close positioning increased or decreased with change in parameter 
values. Detailed results are available from the authors. Below, we present the qualitative 
insights we obtained and their intuition. 
Qualitative Insight 3 (cost of store brand, csl 
Other things equal, positioning a store brand close to the national brand is likely to be less 
profitable (or unprofitable) when the cost of store brand is higher. 
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This finding is expected. When the cost of store brand c8 is higher, for any given store brand 
price, the retailer gets lower margins p s - c s from store brand sales. So, s/he has less incentive 
to promote store brand sales by positioning the store brand close to the national brand. 
Qualitative Insight 4 (initial mean reservation price, Jlr l 
Given the same cost of store brand, positioning a store brand close to the national brand is 
likely to be more profitable when the initial mean reservation price is higher. 
High reservation price implies that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for national and 
store brands in the category. Hence, equilibrium national brand price and store brand price, and 
thus category average price increase. Given the same costs, national brand margin, store brand 
margin, and category margin also increase. In this high-price, high-margin scenario, retailer 
tends to get greater absolute margin and profit increase due to close store brand positioning. As 
a simple illustration, when Jlr = 3, close store brand positioning ( Jld : 1 ~ 0.6) results in an 
increase in store brand margin from 1.8 to 1.84 and retailer profits from 83.27 to 84.83 (a 
percentage increase of 1.87% but an absolute increase of 1.56 units). However, when Jlr = 10, 
close store brand positioning results in an increase in store brand margin from 6.76 to 6.88 and 
retailer profits from 583.9 to 595 (nearly same percentage increase of 1.9% but an absolute 
increase of 11.1 units). In some sense, the effect of an increase in mean reservation price can be 
deemed simply as a scaling effect. 
High Jlr =>High category price=> High category margin=> Higher absolute incremental 
profits from close positioning 
This line of reasoning leads to two inferred qualitative insights: 
Qualitative Insight 4A (category price) 
Other things equal, positioning a store brand close to the national brand is likely to be 
more profitable in higher-priced categories. 
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Qualitative Insight 4B (category margin) 
Other things equal, positioning a store brand close to the national brand is likely to be 
more profitable in categories with higher gross retail margin. 
Qualitative Insight 5 (heterogeneity in reservation price differential, cr d 2 
Positioning a store brand close to the national brand is less profitable when consumers are 
more heterogeneous in their reservation price differential. 
One possible intuition is as follows. When a store brand is positioned closer to the national 
brand, retailer appropriately sets a smaller price differential, yet gains a higher sales of the 
higher-margin store brand and can increase its total profits. When cr d is large, consumers are 
widely dispersed in their reservation price differential and the smaller price differential does not 
yield a sufficiently large volume of store brand consumers. However, when cr d is small, 
consumers are more concentrated in their RPD. Retailers can set a small price differential in the 
concentrated region and capture a significant number of store brand consumers and increase its 
profits. (Note: Heterogeneity in reservation price, cr r did not yield any qualitative insight and 
hence not reported here.) 
Qualitative Insight 6 (Market size, K) 
When close store brand positioning increases retailer profits, the incremental profits 
increase in proportion to the number of consumers in the market- the larger the market 
size, the greater is the incremental profits. 
Market size or total number of consumers in the market enters the demand function in a 
multiplicative manner. Therefore, equilibrium prices are not affected and the equilibrium 
quantities sold and profits increase in direct proportion to the market size. As a result, 
incremental profits from store brand positioning change in direct proportion to the market size. 
For example, if market size increases 10 times from 100 to 1000 consumers, incremental profits 
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from store brand positioning are 10 times higher. So, when conditions are conducive for close 
store brand positioning, larger the market size, the greater is the incentive to position the store 
brand closer to the national brand. 
Qualitative Insight 7 (National brand market share) 
Positioning a store brand close to the national brand would be more profitable in markets 
where the national brand market share is higher. 
While national brand market share is not a parameter in the model, previous researchers have 
considered this variable. We compared the national brand market share when close store brand 
positioning is profitable to corresponding situations where close positioning is not profitable. In 
general, the average national brand market share is higher when conditions are conducive for 
store brand positioning than when it is not. For example, in Figure 4, when v = 1, close store 
brand positioning is not profitable for the retailer. The average national brand share in this case 
was 20.1 %. When v = 0.6, close store brand positioning is profitable for the retailer and the 
average national brand share in this case was 32.4%. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) and is 
intuitive. When the national brand has a high market share, there is a greater market for the store 
brand to attract when it positions its brand close to the national brand (also see Sethuraman and 
Srinivasan 2002 for a similar argument with respect to price discounts). Therefore, other things 
equal, retailer should find it more profitable to adopt close store brand positioning. 
5.2. Relaxing Certain Assumptions in the Basic Model 
Incorporating Correlation between r i and d i 
In our model, we have assumed independence between r i and d i . That is, consumers 
reservation price differential (premium they will pay for the national brand over a store brand) is 
independent of the reservation price (maximum price willing to pay) for the national brand. 
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However, there is a general belief that those with high reservation price may have high 
reservation price differential- i.e., a positive correlation between r i and d i. We incorporate 
this correlation in the following stylized manner. Using a median(= mean) split, we define high 
reservation price (HR) consumers as those with ri > J..lr ; low reservation price (LR) consumers 
were defined as those whose q < J..lr . The reservation price differential for the two consumer 
groups is assumed as follows: 
LR Consumers: di ~ N(J..Ldl, cr d) and 
HR Consumers: di ~ N(J..Ldh, cr d), 
where J..ldh > J..ldl indicating positive correlation. The demand functions can be rewritten as 
(10) qn ~K[l- <!>( Pn cr~l'r J ][!-<!>( Pn- ~sd- l'dh J }r Pn > l'r 
(II) qn ~K{o.s[l-<I>(Pn -~d-l'dh Jl 
(12) q5 ~K[l-<l>(Pncr~l'r JJ[ <l>(Pn -~,d-l'dh ]+qs2 }fPn >Jlr 
(13) q, ~ K * 0.5<!>( Pn-~d- l'dh J + K [ 0.5- <!>( Pn cr~l'r J] <I> ( Pn -:~-I'd! J + qs2 if Pn<Jtr 
We assumed J..ldl = 0.5 and J..ldh = 1.5 (positive correlation). We computed retailer profits 
( IIr3) with all parameters at the initial values in Table 1. Then, we decreased both J..ldl and J..ldh 
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by cS (say cS = .1) and computed retailer profits again. The difference yields the incremental 
profits under correlated condition. 
We assumed 1-ldl = 1 and J.!dh = 1 (no correlation). We computed retailer profits with 
all parameters at the initial values in Table 1. Then, we decreased both J.!dl and J.!dh by the 
same cS ( .1) and computed retailer profits again. The difference yields the incremental profits 
under uncorrelated condition. 
We compared the incremental profits from correlated condition with the profits from the 
uncorrelated condition and repeated the same for different values of J.!dl, J.!dh, 8. Our analysis 
yields the following qualitative insight. 
Qualitative Insight 8 (correlation between reservation price and RPD) 
Positioning a store brand close to the national brand is less profitable when consumers' 
reservation prices and reservation price differential are positively correlated than when 
they are not. 
To see the intuition for this, let us consider an extreme case with all high reservation price (HR) 
consumers having very high reservation price differential (can be deemed as being loyal to the 
national brand) and all low reservation price consumers having zero reservation price differential 
(the price sensitive segment). In this case, the optimal retailer action is to target the national 
brand to the HR market and target the store brand to the price sensitive LR market. Trying to 
position the store brand to target national brand consumers would not be profitable because not 
many consumers would switch to the store brand. This is the classic segmentation view of store 
branding -- the role of store brand is to attract the high price sensitive I low quality sensitive 
segment, not to take market share away from national brands. More generally, when high 
reservation price (HR) consumers also have high reservation price differential (HRPD), the 
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retailer may be better off targeting the national brand to the HRIHRPD consumers and the store 
brand for the LR/LRPD consumers, other things equal. 
Relationship between lld and v 
Parameter v is the proportion of consumers who can not afford the national brand that end up 
purchasing the store brand. "v" can be influenced by 
(i) nature of category - if it is an essential good such as baby food or diapers, consumers 
may be more likely to purchase the store brand so long as Ps < ri (high v). 
(ii) nature of consumers - if consumers with low reservation price are price sensitive 
such that they are willing to purchase the store brand so long as Ps < ri 
(iii) store brand perception - if consumers perceive store brand to be not as good as 
national brand, but of acceptable quality, 
(iv) store image- if consumers perceive that any brands with the store name would be 
reasonable quality. 
In the basic model, we assume v as an exogenous parameter so as to focus directly on store brand 
positioning through (J..td). It is likely, however, that positioning store brand against national 
brand (decreasing lld) may indirectly increase v. To capture this possibility, we related v to J..ld 
with the following function, v = v 0 + b(1- lld) -- v 0 , b >0. We varied v 0 and b in a reasonable 
range such that v $; 1 and conducted the equilibrium analysis as before. Coefficient b can be 
interpreted as the effect of close store brand positioning in persuading the unserved market 
segment to purchase the store brand. As would be expected, incremental profits from close store 
brand positioning 1- lld increase with b because store brand sales is increased both in the 
competitive (NS) market and in the unserved ( NS) market. Qualitative insight 1 related to 
category expandability holds. Qualitative insight 2 is not relevant since v is now endogenous. 
Manufacturer influencing positioning ( lld ).,_ 
So far, we have assumed that the national brand manufacturer engages in reservation 
price enhancing activities that expand category demand through !lr but do not influence 
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positioning parameter ( J.ld ). In the real world, it may be possible for the manufacturer also to 
influence J.ld through its promotions. This ability would be deemed as the substitution role of 
manufacturer's promotions. For example, some national brands (e.g., Pine sol floor cleaner) use 
comparison advertising and claim that their product is superior to cheaper private labels. To 
capture this possibility, we consider the situation where the manufacturer can also influence 
(increase) J.ld and speculate what the retailer's optimal action would be with respect to store 
brand positioning. The following table reports our assessment of optimal retailer action: 
Mfr cant J.ld only (only Mfr cant J.ld and J.lr (substitution and 
substitution, no category expansion) category expansion) 
v high (~1) Retailer should not oppose Retailer should not oppose manufacturer's 
manufacturer's effort to effort to differentiate the NB from SB. 
differentiate the NB from SB. 
v moderate c~.6) Retailer should attempt to oppose Retailer's decision to oppose 
manufacturer's differentiation by manufacturer's effort to differentiate 
positioning SB close to NB. would depend on the tradeoff between the 
incremental benefits from category 
expansion (higher J.lr) and decreased 
profits from substitution (higher J.ld ). 
Note from findings F14 and F17 that when vis high, an increase in J.ld actually favors the 
retailer. Suppose the manufacturer can differentiate its brand and increase J.ld from its present 
state of 1 to 1.2 (say). Then, equilibrium wholesale and retail price of national brand increase 
and store brand price decreases. These changes increase the unserved market ( NS) - see Figure 
2. If the retailer is getting a significant portion of this unserved market then the retailer stands to 
benefit from the differentiation. However, ifv is not very high, as explained in QI2, retailer may 
stand to lose from differentiation (t J.ld) and must try to oppose the effort through close store 
brand positioning. 
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6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The analytical model enabled us to address the first two objectives of this manuscript as 
enumerated in the introduction section - (i) investigate if close store brand positioning is always 
profitable, and if not (ii) identify market conditions when close store brand positioning may be 
less profitable or unprofitable. The empirical analysis section addresses the next two objectives 
-(iii) prescribe type of categories in which retailers should (or should not) position the store 
brand close to the national brand, and (iv) investigate/explain retailers' actual store brand 
positioning behavior. 
6.1. Hypotheses 
The qualitative insights from §4 and §5 identify eight market characteristics, which could 
influence incremental profits from close store brand positioning. These theoretical variables are 
listed in Table 3 (Column 2). The greater the incremental profits from close store brand 
positioning, the more likely that the retailer will position the store brand close to a national 
brand. We use this premise to test the implications of the analytical model and identify in what 
type of categories retailers actually position the store brand close to the national brand. 
Table 3 
Variables Used in Empirical Analysis 
QI Theoretical Variable derived Hyp. Data Previous research where 
# variable for empirical relation source data source used 
(Notation) analysis (Acronym) from 
QI 
1 Cost of category Category - Expert --
expansion, C(J..lr) expandability Opinion (EXPAND) 
1 Cost of category Advertising - BARILNA Sethuraman and Tellis 
expansion, C(f..lr) expenditure Report (2002) (ADEXP) 
2 Proportion of No data N/A N/A 
available -
unserved market 
served by store 
brand (v) 
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3 Relative cost of Ease of private - Info scan --
store brand label supply - # of Supermark 
vendors 
manufacture ( Cs) (PLSUPPLY) etReview 
4A Mean reservation Category average + Marketing Narsimhan, Neslin and 
price ( f.!r) => price per purchase Factbook Sen (1996), Sethuraman (PRICE) 
category price and Tellis (2002), 
Ailawadi, Lehmarm and 
Neslin (2003) 
4B Mean reservation Gross retail % + Supermark Same as QI 4A 
margin 
price ( f.!r) => (%MARGIN) etNews 
category margin 
5 Variance in Coefficient of Consumer Sethuraman and Cole 
variation in RPD -
reservation price (RPDV ARIANCE) survey (1999) 
differential (ad ) 
6 Market size (K) - Household + Marketing -- same as QI4A --penetration % # of consumers (PENETRATION) Factbook 
6 Market size (K) Purchase Freq. + Marketing -- same as Q14A --(PURFREQ) Factbook 
7 National brand National brand + Marketing Sayman, Hoch and Raju 
market share 
market share (NBS HARE) Fact book (2002) 




a+= high values on the variable favors close store brand positioning (increases retailer profits) 
-=high values on the variable does not favor close store brand positioning (decreases retailer profits) 
QI =Qualitative Insight (from §4.3 and §5.1). 
Table 3 (Column 3) lists the category characteristics derived or inferred from the 
theoretical variables. Data are not available to test the implications for two variables -
proportion of unserved market served by store brand (v) and correlation between reservation 
price and RPD. The transition from theoretical variables (qualitative insights) to category 
characteristics for empirical testing is fairly straight forward in most cases except for cost of 
category expansion and market size. As stated in qualitative insight 1, low cost of category 
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expansion implies that the category is expandable relative to a situation with high cost. An 
offshoot of the expandability result is the relationship between advertising and store 
brand positioning. In our case, when category is expandable through advertising, 
manufacturers would have high advertising budgets and retailer would be better off not 
positioning the store brand close to the national brand. In the analytical model, market 
size is the total number (K) of consumers in the market. In the real world, both number 
of households that purchase the product and the frequency of purchase (which is assumed 
to be constant at 1 in our analytical model) determine unit volume market size. 
Therefore, we consider both variables. 
Based on the above discussion, we have the following expectations: 
The likelihood of positioning a store brand close to the national brand is higher in 
(i) less expandable categories, 
(ii) less advertised categories 
(iii) categories where supply of private labels is easier to obtain (less costly), 
(iv) high priced categories, 
(v) high margin categories, 
(vi) categories where consumers are heterogeneous in their reservation price differential, 
(vii) categories with higher household penetration, 
(viii) frequently purchased categories, and 
(ix) categories with higher national brand market share. 
The operationalization of these category characteristics and their data sources are described next. 
6.2. Operationalization of Variables and Data Source 
Dependent Variable - Store Brand Positioning. Data on store brand positioning are based 
on observations in two stores located in the same neighborhood but belonging to two different 
supermarket chains. Following Sayman, Hoch, and Raju (2002), positioning a store brand close 
to a national brand is reflected in (i) placing the store brand next to the national brand on the 
shelf, (ii) using "compare and save" or similar slogans, and (iii) imitating national brand 
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packaging. We also employ these three criteria for assessing the positioning of store brand. The 
first two criteria can be objectively observed. The third criterion is more subjective and was 
determined based on the assessment and agreement by two trained observers. 
In each product category, the store brand is observed in tandem with each of the national 
brand. For that store brand, with any national brand (say A), the following observations are 
made: (i) Is the store brand located next to national brand (A), (ii) Is there a shelf talker 
comparing the store brand with national brand (A), and (iii) does the store brand have similar 
packaging as national brand (A). The same three questions were answered for other national 
brands (B, C etc.). In each product category, the national brand that satisfied the maximum 
number among the three criteria was considered the focal national brand. In a given product 
category, we declared a store brand to be positioned close to a national brand if it satisfied at 
least two of the above three criteria. All three criteria were satisfied in less than 5% of the 
observed categories and therefore appeared to be too stringent a condition for determining store 
brand positioning. In particular, shelf talkers were used in very few categories even when there 
appeared to be an obvious attempt to imitate the national brand, based on other criteria. 
Independent Variables - Category Characteristics. Table 3 lists the variables, their 
operationalization and data source. Category expandability was determined based on expert 
opinion. For each product category, we asked three grocery products experts their level of 
agreement to the following statement: 
"Total category sales in this product category can be increased through non-price marketing 
investments such as advertising, product improvement, sampling, publicity, or other non-price 
promotions. " 
A 5-point Likert scale (1 =strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) was used. The average 
correl_ation across the three experts was 0.62, indicating reasonable agreement. Their ratings 
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were added to get an expandability score for each category. The judgment based measure 
appeared to have face validity- categories that are in the relatively early stage of the product life 
cycle (e.g., bottled water) and more hedonic products such as soft drinks and cookies had the 
highest expandability scores (> 13/15); whereas, mature categories and categories that are 
considered commodities (e.g., salt, sugar) scored the lowest on expandability (<6/15). The 
correlation between expandability and national brand advertising was positive and significant 
(0.36), as we predicted, providing some nomological validity. 
Media advertising expenditures for the categories were obtained from Leading National 
Advertisers (LNA) class/brand summary (1999) following the procedure used in Hoch and 
Banerji (1993), Sethuraman and Tellis (2002) and Ailwadi, Lehmann and Neslin (2003). 
We use number of supply vendors in the product category as a surrogate for ease of 
private label supply. First, a large number of suppliers in a category suggests less barriers to 
entry, thus ease of manufacturing. Second, a large number of vendors suggests that there are 
many fringe manufacturers with little market power. According to Stem (1966), a retailer may 
be able to persuade one or more of the fringe firms to supply private labels at low cost. Number 
of vendors was directly taken from Infoscan Supermarket Review (1994). 
In a prelude to a detailed analysis of 20 product categories, Sethuraman and Cole (1999) 
collected reservation price differential data on 120 product categories from over 180 consumers 
(each reporting data for 40 categories) and computed their means and standard deviations. To 
account for differences in the means, we used the coefficient of variation (standard deviation I 
mean) as a measure of heterogeneity in reservation price differential. 
Data on category level purchase price, household penetration and purchase frequency 
were obtained from the Marketing Factbook (1994), consistent with previous research 
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(Narasimhan, Neslin and Sen 1995, Sethuraman and Tellis 2002, Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 
2003). Data on category margin was obtained from Supermarket News, as in Sethuraman and 
Tellis (2002). As in Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002), market share for the focal national brand 
was obtained from the Marketing Factbook. 
6.3. Preliminary Analysis 
Data on all dependent and independent variables are available for 109 product categories. 
We use this data for our analysis. To gain a preliminary understanding, we addressed the 
question: Do stores in the same neighborhood belonging to two different chains exhibit similar 
store brand positioning behavior, that is, position the store brand close to the national brand in 
the same categories? If they do, it indicates that product/market characteristics potentially drive 
store brand positioning behavior. The following cross-tabulation indicates the extent of 
agreement. 
Positioned against a 
national brand? 
Chain A Total 
Yes No (Chain B) 
Positioned against a Yes 26 (23.9%) 11(10.1%) 37 (34.0%) 
national brand? 
Chain B No 7 (6.4%) 65 (59.6%) 72 (66.0%) 
Total (Chain A) 33 (30.3%) 76 (69.7%) 109 (100%) 
In Chain A, store brand was positioned against a national brand in 33 (30.3%) out of 109 
categories; in Chain B, store brand was positioned against a national brand in 37 (34.0%) out of 
109 categories. These percentages are similar to the numbers in Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) 
-- 32% and 39% in the two stores they observed. Interestingly, in 91 (83.5%) of the 109 
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categories, store brand positioning behavior was the same across stores, that is, both stores 
positioned against a national brand or both did not follow any targeted positioning strategy. 
6.4. Analysis of Antecedent Factors 
Our main interest is in identifying category characteristics that influence a retailer's 
decision to position its store brand close to the national brand. We estimate the following binary 




P(position = 1) = -- , where 
l+ev 
v = bo + b1 (EXPAND)+ b2 (ADVERTISING)+ b3 (PLSUPPLY) + 
b4 (PRICE)+ bs (%MARGIN)+ b6 (RPDVARIANCE) + 
b7 (PENETRATION) bg (PURFREQ) + bg (NBSHARE). 
P(position=l) implies the probability that the store brand in a category is positioned against a 
particular national brand. The empirical results are presented in Table 4. 
Four of the nine variables in Chain A and four variables in Chain B were statistically 
significant and in the hypothesized direction. In particular, positioning a store brand close to the 
national brand is less likely in categories whose sales are expandable and in highly advertised 
categories, but more likely in high-margin categories and where the leading national brand has a 
large market share. 
Multicollinearity does not appear to be a major problem in estimating Equation (14)- the 
magnitude of the highest correlation between any two independent variables is .44 (between 
purchase cycle and household penetration). One notable difference was that the coefficient of 
advertising increased and was significant at p<.Ol when expandability was not in the model. 
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Description of Variables 
Category expandability 
Advertising expenditure 
Ease of private label supply 
Variance in RPD across 
consumers 
Average price per purchase ($) 
Category % margin 
Household Penetration (%) 
Frequency of purchase 









- -.011 (.0065)* 
+ .019 (.029) 
- 1.21 (1.98) 
+ .018 (.305) 
+ .156 (.078)* 
+ .025 (.018) 
+ -.015 (.156) 














~egative sign implies that positioning a store brand close to the national brand is less likely in 
categories that are expandable than in categories that are not expandable. 
** p < .01. *p < .05- one-tailed test. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper is motivated by the general belief, supported by theoretical and empirical 
literature, that retailers are better off positioning a store brand close to the national brands. In 
this research, we investigate the basic question- do retailers always benefit by positioning their 
store brand close to the national brand? 
7.1. Discussion of Key Results and Contribution 
Analysis of a game-theoretic model reveals some insights regarding the market 
conditions when it may not be profitable for the retailer to compete intensely with the focal 
national brand. The first insight relates to the product life cycle concept. Retailers may be better 
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off not positioning its store brand close to the national brand in categories where the 
manufacturer can expand category demand through non-price marketing investments such as 
product improvements and advertising. Such product categories would include products in the 
early stage of the life cycle, where marketing would promote purchase of the product by 
increasing awareness and educating consumers. Such categories may also include hedonistic 
products where advertising could increase consumption pleasure and induce consumers to 
purchase. The intuition for this result is that by positioning the store brand close to the national 
brand, the retailer would force the national brand manufacturer to focus on price reduction and 
discourage him/her from investing in category demand enhancing activities, an action that could 
be detrimental to both manufacturer and retailer. 
The second key insight relates to the notion of segmentation. Positioning the store brand 
close to a national brand may not be profitable when there is a significant "unserved" market 
(demand that is not met at given national brand prices) that can be served by the store brand 
(qualitative insight-- QI2), when there is a significant variation in consumers' reservation prices 
differential (QI5) and when high reservation price consumers are more loyal to the national 
brand (high RPD) while low reservation price consumers are price sensitive (low RPD)- QI8. 
All these market conditions are conducive for the store brand to be used as a segmentation tool--
target store brand for the low reservation price consumers and the national brand for the high 
reservation price consumers. In addition, positioning a store brand close to the national brand 
may be less profitable when the cost of store brand is higher, category price and margins are 
lower, the market size is smaller, or when the competing national brand has a low market share. 
A follow-up empirical test of the hypotheses derived from the analytical results provides 
additional insights about actual retailer behavior. Of particular interest is the empirical 
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relationship between advertising and store brand positioning. There are two conflicting 
theoretical viewpoints on this relationship. The piggybacking theory of store brand positioning, 
advanced in our analytical model, would state that store brands should not be positioned close to 
highly advertised national brands. This is because, in categories conducive for advertising, 
national brands can advertise heavily and increase its own sales and category sales. The retailer 
benefits from this increased demand both through higher prices and profits from the national 
brand. The increased price of the national brand offers greater pricing flexibility for the store 
brand. Rather than competing head-on with the national brand, the retailer may be better off 
availing of this conducive demand environment (piggybacking) and position a store brand to 
predominantly gain customers who are less willing to buy the national brand at the higher prices. 
The countervailing power view of store brand positioning would suggest that store brands 
should be positioned close to the highly advertised brand. Through advertising, the national 
brand manufacturers are able to differentiate their brands and wield power over the retailers. By 
positioning a store brand close to the national brand, the retailer will be able to counter the 
advertising power and gain more profits (Morton and Zettelmeyer 2000). Our empirical finding 
appears to support the piggybacking theory of store brand positioning, though there may be 
alternate explanations for the observed positive relationship. 
We also find that store brands tend to target leading national brands, especially brands 
with large market share, supporting our analytical results and the theoretical and empirical results 
of Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002). Thus, this paper makes a theoretical contribution in 
identifying some conditions when close store brand positioning may not be profitable for the 
retailer and an empirical contribution in understanding retailers' actual positioning behavior. 
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7 .2. Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The inclusion of category expansion parameter, normally distributed consumer 
heterogeneity of reservation prices, and the notion of unserved market demand is both a strength 
of this manuscript and a potential limitation. On the one hand, the model allows us to investigate 
variables that have not been considered in previous marketing channels literature. For example, 
our quick review of all Marketing Science issues published since its inception (1983-2003) 
revealed 18 articles employing game-theoretic models in channels of distribution. A majority of 
these articles (12118) used linear in price (aggregate) demand functions. Other studies used log-
linear, quadratic, or more general aggregate, demand functions with price as the only variable. A 
few studies incorporated heterogeneity in consumer reservation price but assumed a uniform 
distribution leading to a linear in price demand structure. We did not find any research that 
incorporated the variables mentioned above, which we believe is a strength of this manuscript. 
On the other hand, the demand functions in our model are non-linear and do not lend 
themselves to analysis using closed-form solutions and comparative statics. Therefore, we had 
to resort to numerical analysis procedure. However, we believe our results are credible for the 
following reasons: 
(i) the demand functions and profit functions appear to be smooth and well behaved, 
leading to interpretable equilibrium solutions, 
(ii) the choice of parameters was made easy since all of them (except v and K) could be 
expressed in monetary units and could be drawn from previous literature, 
(iii) the results appear to be robust in the range of parameters investigated, 
(iv) all the results are intuitive or can be explained, and 
(v) many of the results are consistent with findings from previous literature. 
Nevertheless, future researchers may attempt to validate or negate results from this study using a 
more direct calculus approach. 
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The analytical model also incorporated only one national brand in one retail outlet and 
considered only the demand-enhancing role of manufacturer's non-price marketing investments. 
This modeling approach appeared to be sufficient for our purpose. Ifthere are two or more 
national brands, the category expandability result (Qil) would still hold. The unserved by 
national brand market may diminish because there are many national brands to serve the market. 
The question of how this situation would influence store brand positioning would depend on the 
nature of the competitive relationship among the national brands. 
Incorporating store competition into the analytical model is relatively complex. We are 
unable to say whether the basic results would change in the presence of store competition. 
Future research can incorporate multiple brands, store competition, and different roles of 
advertising in the analytical models. Future research can also study the possibility of 
manufacturers offering more trade deals and inducing the retailer to offer temporary price 
discounts on the national brand to ward off, or in reaction to, close store brand positioning. 
The empirical analysis is based on data from two stores in one geographic market. Future 
research can test the generalizability of the results obtained in this research by collecting data 
from different markets and by using more direct measures of the variables (e.g., private label 
cost) and incorporating additional variables such as reservation price. In particular, we have 
introduced the notion that the size of unserved market can play a significant role in a retailer's 
positioning decision, but we do not have any empirical measures. Getting an estimate of the size 
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